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ABSTRACT
During the recent Financial Crisis, as well as the 2010 and ongoing European Sovereign Debt 
Crisis, several governments had/have had to raise their debt levels in order to stabilize their 
economies. The principal problem attributed to sovereign debts, which is  linked to their 
characteristics, is the possibility of defaults occurring in relation to these –  since they are 
usually  accompanied without collaterals. The possibilities of such defaults occurring are 
further increased where bailouts are granted in relation to these debts. Increased doubts in 
relation to the likelihood of larger sovereigns “rolling over maturing debt on their own”, as 
well as the consequential occurrence  of “very high, economically penalizing, interest rates”, 
is considered to be the present reality.
This paper aims to illustrate why distressed countries, once granted bail-outs, should be given 
full assurance (by grantors of the bail-outs) that continued assistance will be provided in the 
form of accompanying aids to assist in completing repayments relating to such bailouts 
(through  the extension  of  repayment periods  or  reduced interest rates)  –  rather  than 
aggravating their position (hence facilitating the risk of defaults).
As well as a consideration of improvements which have been introduced through Basel III in 
respect  of  prudential  supervisory  tools  (supervisory  tools  such  as  capital,  liquidity 
requirements, and macro prudential policy tools), and an analysis of recent efforts which have 
been undertaken by the Basel Committee to address information gaps in derivative markets (a 
source of huge losses to many major banks), the paper also explores how the new Basel 
liquidity standards (that is, the Liquid Coverage Ratio (LCR) and the Net Stable Funding 
Ratio  (NSFR),  could  be  effectively  implemented  in  mitigating  sovereign  debt crises. 
Ultimately, the paper will seek to demonstrate that additional leverage ratios which are to be 
introduced by the Basel Committee, will play a very crucial role if the new liquidity standards 
are to achieve their desired effects and stated objectives.
Key Words: European Sovereign Debt Crisis; Basel III; Dodd Frank Act; Capital standards; 
Liquidity Standards; macro prudential policy  tools; Over-the-Counter (OTC)  derivatives; 
Credit-Default-Swaps (CDS); markets; disclosure; bank; regulation; leverage ratios
Capital, Liquidity Standards and Macro Prudential Policy Tools in Financial 
Supervision: Addressing Sovereign Debt Problems
Marianne Ojo1
A. Introduction
Even though it is argued that the most recent Financial Crisis was a capital crisis - not a 
liquidity crisis, events such as the failure of Northern Rock, as well as problems encountered 
by  major  banks  which  were considered  to have  been  complying  with  Basel  Capital 
requirements, are plausible indicators of the fact that the recent Financial Crisis was triggered 
by pro cyclical, as well as liquidity related issues such as maturity transformations. The focus 
accorded by the Basel  Committee on Banking  Supervision to capital requirements - as 
opposed  to liquidity  standards,  also  provided  further  justification  for  evidence which 
corroborates a lack of sufficient focus on matters and factors which contribute in triggering a 
liquidity, and ultimately, banking crises.
Whilst it is  widely agreed and not disputed that capital and liquidity requirements both 
contributed to the most recent Financial Crisis, the extent to which Basel III  addresses 
major/fundamental questions arising from the Crisis, provides further grounds for further 
debates. This paper considers those fundamental issues which have arisen in light of the 
recent Crisis against the background of efforts which have been made by the Basel Committee 
to consolidate capital, liquidity standards –  as well as macro prudential policy tools. As well 
as highlighting the increased focus accorded by the Basel Committee to the macro prudential 
level, the paper will consider macro prudential policies which have been introduced to address 
system wide risks.
The first four sections of this paper (subsequent to the introductory section) will consider 
improvements  which  have been introduced through  Basel  III  in  respect of  prudential 
supervisory tools. To facilitate this aim, these sections will consider capital, liquidity and 
macro prudential supervisory tools which currently exist or are about to be introduced. In 
emphasizing the need for greater focus on macro prudential policies –  which ultimately 
facilitate a more system-wide market based approach to regulation, sections two to five 
illustrate how Basel III’s more macro prudential focus should help facilitate the monitoring of 
vital and useful information such as market wide data on asset prices and liquidity. The need 
for such monitoring being of vital importance since derivative markets, (and the Over-the-
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Counter (O-T-C) derivatives market in particular –  being the largest2 market for derivatives), 
are largely unregulated with respect to the disclosure of information between parties. 
Hence the sixth section of the paper will consider the importance of information gaps –  
particularly within OTC markets, as well as steps taken by the Basel Committee to address 
these. The second half of this paper (commencing with section six) seeks to address two 
important aspects, namely:
i) The need to introduce measures which are aimed at facilitating greater disclosure in 
respect of complex instruments which banks are exposed to during the course of their 
daily  transactions. One of  such complex instruments being  the OTC  derivatives 
markets –  whereby many major banks are exposed to huge losses.
A second means whereby many major banks could be exposed to huge losses is attributed to 
sovereign debt exposures.  “Many European banks are thought to have large holdings of 
sovereign debt from the “peripheral” countries that have not been marked-to-market, and thus 
represent sizeable potential  losses  for the banks  when the sovereign debt is  ultimately 
restructured.” 3
Sovereign debt exposures, the effects of bail  outs resulting from sovereign debts, ways 
whereby the new Basel liquidity standards could help address sovereign debt problems (as 
well as other measures which have been proposed), will constitute the focus of discussion in 
relation to the remaining sections of this paper.
ii) The sovereign debt problem leads us to the second important aspect, the importance of 
timely  implementation  of  additional  leverage  ratios  which  have  recently  been 
introduced by the Basel Committee. If the two new liquidity standards, the Liquidity 
Coverage Ratio (LCR), and the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR), are introduced 
2
2
 The “OTC  derivative market is  the largest market for  derivatives. According  to the Bank  for 
International Settlements, the total outstanding notional amount is US  $684 trillion (as of June 2008). Of this 
notional amount, 67%  comprise interest rate contracts; 8%  credit default swaps (CDS); 9%  foreign exchange 
contracts; 2%  commodity contracts; 1%  equity contracts; and 12%  other. Because OTC  derivatives are not 
traded on an exchange, there is no central counter party and they are therefore subject to counter party risk –  like 
an ordinary contract (since each counterparty relies on the other to perform).” See Financial Stability Board, 
“Implementing OTC Derivatives Market Reforms” 25th October 2010 
<http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_101025.pdf>  and also 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Derivative_(finance)#OTC_and_exchange_traded>
3
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 “The ECB and the European central banks”, it is further argued, “need to identify those banks that are 
impaired by excessive sovereign holdings and assist them in recapitalization –  however, also pushing the larger, 
stronger banks to accept exchange offers in the interest of bank transparency and restructuring as well as in 
resolving the sovereign debt problem.” See N  Economides and RC  Smith, “Trichet Bonds To  Resolve the 
European Sovereign Debt Problem” January 2011  at pages 2 and 3 <http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1836743>
without coupling these to the additional new leverage ratios, this could lead to a 
concentration of banks’ funds –  which could subsequently be vulnerable to sovereign 
exposures.
Basel III  is considered to be “fundamentally different” from Basel I  and II  as a result of its 
combination of “micro and macro prudential reforms to address both institution and system 
level risks.”4
Basel I I I  = Enhanced Basel I I  + Macro prudential Outlay5
Enhanced Basel I I  = Micro prudential Framework (aimed at “increasing quantity as well as 
improving quality of capital, adequate capital charges needed in the trading book, enhancing 
risk management and disclosure, introducing a leverage ratio to supplement risk weighted 
measures, addressing counter party risk posed by Over-the Counter (OTC) derivatives.”)
Macro Prudential Outlay:
This aspect addresses:
i)  ”stability over time” (pro cyclicality) through:
- Counter cyclical capital charges and forward looking provisioning
- Capital conservation rules for stronger capital buffers
ii) As well as “stability at each point in time” (system wide approach):
4
4
 With respect to micro prudential aspects, Basel III  reforms indicate i) “Significant increase in risk 
coverage –  with focus on areas that were most problematic during the Crisis  (for example, trading book 
exposures, counterparty credit risk, and securitization activities); ii) fundamental tightening of the definition of 
capital –  as well as a strong focus on common equity (introduction of requirements that all capital instruments 
must absorb losses at the point of non-viability –  which was not the case during the most recent Financial Crisis); 
iii) Introduction of  a leverage ratio which should serve as a backstop to the risk based framework; iv) the 
introduction of global liquidity standards to address short-term and long term liquidity mismatches; and v) 
Enhancements to Pillar 2’s supervisory review process and Pillar 3’s market discipline –  particularly for trading 
and securitization activities.” S  Walter, “Basel III: Stronger Banks and a More Resilient Financial System” 
http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp110406.pdf at page 3 of 12
5
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 See H Hannoun, „Towards a Global Financial Stability Framework” Bank for International Settlements 
Publications page 9 of 26 <http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp100303.pdf>
- Systemic capital surcharge for systemically important financial institutions
- Identify inter linkages and common exposures among all financial institutions
- Systemic oversight of OTC derivatives (CCP infrastructure)
Weaknesses in Basel rules will be considered from the perspective attributed by such rules to 
capital and liquidity requirements. 
B. Capital Requirements
As  highlighted in several papers,6 Basel  II’s  internal credit risk  models7 were not only 
considered to be:
- Unduly  risk  sensitive, but also tended to generate pro cyclical effects. This  was 
illustrated during the Northern Rock Crisis.8 It has also been stated9 that Basel rules 
focused on one type of risk –  the risk that a bank would make too many bad loans and 
6
6
 For example, see M  Ojo, “Basel III and Responding to the Recent Financial Crisis: Progress made by 
the Basel Committee in relation to the Need for Increased Bank Capital and Increased Quality of Loss Absorbing 
Capital” http://ssrn.com/abstract=1680886 at page 3 of 15. “The introduction of Basel II  resulted in changes 
being made to the 1988 Basel Capital Accord to provide for a choice of three broad approaches to credit risk. 
This was introduced into Basel II  in view of the realization that the optimal balance may differ significantly 
across banks. The increased focus on risk (and particularly credit risk), resulted from growing realization of the 
importance of risk within the financial sector. The range of approaches to credit risk –  as introduced under Basel 
II, and which also exists for market risk, consists of the Standardised approach (which is the simplest of the three 
broad approaches), the internal  ratings  based (IRB)  foundational  and advanced approaches.” See  Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, “Consultative Document, Standard Approach to Credit Risk, Supporting 
Document to the New Basel Accord, January 2001 at page 1 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca04.pdf and Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, “Consultative Document, The Internal Ratings Based Approach Supporting 
Document to the New Basel Capital Accord” January 2001 Bank for International Settlements publications 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca05.pdf>
7
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 Basel II’s internal credit risk models generated pro cyclical effects –  given the fact that such models 
were overly sensitive in their implementation for the calculation of regulatory capital (their implementation to 
facilitate “the derivation of fundamental inputs for formulas which will determine the level of capital which large 
banks must retain”).
8
8
 “One of the underlying features of the recent Crisis was the build-up of excessive on and off-balance 
sheet leverage in the banking system. In many cases, banks built up excessive leverage while still showing strong 
risk based capital ratios. During the most severe part of the Crisis, the banking sector was forced by the market 
to reduce its leverage in a manner that amplified downward pressure on asset prices, further exacerbating the 
positive feedback loop between losses, declines in bank capital, and contraction in credit availability.” See Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, “Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework For More Resilient Banks and 
Banking Systems” December 2010 at page 68 –  69 of 77 <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf>
lose so much money on those loans (such that its capital was wiped out). Whilst these 
observations reflect the magnitude of attention dedicated to capital requirements, it 
also  highlights  problems  attributed to measurements  in  relation  to such  capital 
requirements. 
- They also generated pro cyclical effects. Pro cyclicality is a fundamental issue arising 
from the implementation of Basel II capital requirements.
Another vital distinction between Basel II  and Basel III  is evident from the fact that under 
Basel III, systemically important banks will  be required to have loss absorbing capacity 
beyond the standards approved and announced on the 12th September 2010.10 Furthermore, the 
Basel Committee and the Financial Stability Board (FSB) are “developing a well integrated 
approach to systemically important financial institutions which could include a combination 
of capital surcharges, contingent capital and bail in debt.”11
Total Regulatory Capital for systemically important banks is considered to be:
[Tier One Capital Ratio] + [Capital Conservation Buffer] + [Counter Cyclical Capital Buffer] 
+ [Capital for Systemically Important Banks]12
9
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 T Congdon, “Northern Rock Shows Up Mess of Basel Rules”  January 2008 < 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/markets/2783500/Northern-Rock-shows-up-mess-of-Basel-rules.html> (last 
visited 18 May 2011)
10
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 See Basel Committee for Banking Supervision, “Groups of Governors and Heads of Supervision 
Announce Higher Global Minimum Capital Standards” 12 September 2010 at page 2 of 7 
<http://www.bis.org/press/p100912.pdf?noframes=1>
11
 ibid
12
 For further information on capital conservation buffer and counter cyclical capital buffer, see section D, 
“Basel III’s Efforts to address Capital and Liquidity Requirements”. See also Basel III Compliance Professionals 
Association  (BiiiCPA),  “The  Basel  III  Accord:  Capital  for  Systemically  Important  Banks  Only”  < 
http://www.basel-iii-accord.com>
C. Liquidity Requirements
In highlighting why the relatively low focus attached to liquidity requirements constituted 
another element of those weaknesses attributed to Basel rules, the importance of liquidity and 
the role of banks in maturity transformations (ultimately triggering banking crises), has been 
demonstrated in several respects.13 The Liquid Coverage Ratio (LCR)  which imposes a 
requirement that banks maintain an adequate level of “unencumbered, high-quality liquid 
assets that can be converted to cash to meet its liquidity needs for a 30 calendar day time 
horizon under severe liquidity stress conditions specified by supervisors”14 and the Net Stable 
Funding Ratio (NSFR) Standard which is designed to “promote longer-term funding of the 
assets and activities of banking organizations by establishing a minimum acceptable amount 
of stable funding based on the liquidity of an institution’s assets and activities over a one-year 
horizon”,15 it is argued, should facilitate a diversification of liquid assets –  hence discouraging 
a situation where they could be accumulated and susceptible to exposures such as those 
relating to sovereign debts. It will however, be highlighted in subsequent sections of the 
paper, that the two new Basel liquidity standards, will probably not achieve their desired 
objectives where such standards are not coupled with leverage ratios.
D. Basel I I I’s Efforts to address Capital and Liquidity Requirements
The incorporation of macro prudential elements into Basel III –  in the form of capital buffers, 
the new liquidity  standards, and leverage ratios, can be regarded as  efforts  aimed at 
addressing capital and liquidity requirements.
Capital Buffers: Such buffers are intended solely (as well as not exclusively) to address 
problems attributed to pro cyclicality. They consist of:
13
1
 For example, see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk 
Management and Supervision” September 2008 at page 1 <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs144.htm>; As  well as 
(banks) being regarded as highly leveraged institutions which are considered to be “at the centre of the credit 
intermediation process”, functions related to credit and maturity transformation are considered to be “vulnerable 
to liquidity runs and loss of confidence.” See also S  Walter, “Basel III: Stronger Banks and a More Resilient 
Financial System” http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp110406.pdf at page 1 of 12
14
 See Basel Committee for Banking Supervision, “Consultative Document, International Framework for 
Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards and Monitoring” December 2009 at page 3 (11 of 44) 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs165.pdf>
15
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- Counter cyclical capital buffers16
- Capital conservation buffers
Counter cyclical capital buffers and capital conservation buffers constitute macro prudential 
tools in the “time dimension”17 –  such tools focusing on the need to mitigate pro-cyclical 
effects.
Whilst counter cyclical capital buffers and capital conservation buffers are synonymous with 
capital  requirements, equivalent “buffers”  which  serve  to address  liquidity  imbalances 
comprise the two new liquidity standards, the Liquid Coverage Ratio (LCR) and the Net 
Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR). Further, these new liquidity standards and the additional 
minimum leverage ratio, it is argued, “could limit the build-up of financial imbalances during 
the expansion phase of the financial cycle. In particular, the additional leverage ratio provides 
an important back stop in cases where excessive optimistic point-in-time risk measures tend to 
shrink risk weighted assets and required cushions.”18
Leverage  Ratios:  The  minimum  leverage  ratio  and  the new  liquidity  standards  are 
considered19 to have the potential to limit the build-up of financial imbalances during the 
expansion phase of the financial cycle. Leverage ratios such as debt ratios (ratio of debt to 
assets); debt-equity ratios, usually provide good indication of an entity’s means of financing. 
Such ratios reflect whether such an entity is able to meet its obligations as it falls due. Hence 
they also reflect how “liquid” a firm is. If the quality of debts issued by an entity is poor, then 
the possibility of redeeming such may result in a situation where the company is left in a 
16
1
 With counter cyclical capital buffers, “the build-up of the buffer is encouraged through restrictions on 
capital distributions. Authorities would then release the buffer based on signs of strains, such as aggregate losses 
or tighter credit terms. In  both cases, the exercise of discretion still  applies.” See Bank for International 
Settlements, “Macro prudential Policy Tools and Frameworks: Update to G20 Finance Ministers and Central 
Bank Governors.” at page 5 <http://www.bis.org/publ/othp13.pdf>
17
The first of two dimensions on which macro prudential policies aim to address system wide risk. The 
second dimension is referred to as “the cross sectional dimension”. The “time-dimension” is defined as “the 
evolution of system-wide risk over time” whilst the “cross sectional dimension” is defined as “the distribution of 
risk in the financial system –  at a given point in time”. See ibid at page 2
18
 Ibid at page 6
19
 See S Walter, “Basel III: Stronger Banks and a More Resilient Financial System” 
http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp110406.pdf at page 6 of 12
vulnerable position (owing to level of losses incurred) –  since it finds it difficult to meet its 
obligations as they fall due. The impact of short term borrowing on maturity and liquidity has 
been considered in various literature on the topic.20
Deleveraging is  a process whereby an undertaking or financial intermediary attempts to 
reduce its balance sheet, for example, by disposing of its assets. Recent Basel III reforms will 
play a huge role in the level of deleveraging (by banks) - which is presently occurring (and 
which is expected to take place in the subsequent months).  
E. Macro prudential policies
A macro prudential policy is one which “uses primarily prudential tools to limit systemic or 
system wide financial risk –  thereby limiting the incidence of disruptions in the provision of 
key financial services that can have serious consequences for the real economy by:
- Dampening the build-up of financial imbalances and building defences which contain 
the speed and sharpness of subsequent downswings and their effects on the economy;
- Identifying  and addressing  common exposures, risk  concentrations, linkages  and 
interdependencies  that are sources  of  contagion  and  spill  over  risks  that may 
jeopardize the functioning of the system as a whole.”21
Pro cyclicality (as well as its impact), is usually attributed to the aggregational build-up of 
system wide risks over time. Policies which exacerbate cyclical tendencies (for example Basel 
II’s capital requirements)/cyclical effects which are exacerbated during peaks and booms and 
which usually demonstrate the impact of aggregational effects of cyclical phases, are referred 
to as being pro cyclical.22
20
2
 “Deleveraging  also  puts  additional downward  pressure  on  financial  markets.”  Furthermore, 
consequences of short term borrowing include “serious liquidity problems especially in the case of financial 
distress: the funding of long term investments through short term debt widens maturity and liquidity gaps, 
making  banks  more vulnerable to runs.” See N  Papanikolaou and C  Wolff, “Leverage and Risk  in  US 
Commercial Banking in the Light of the Recent Financial Crisis.” March 2011 Draft
21
 See Bank for International Settlements, „Macro prudential Policy Tools and Frameworks: Update to 
G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors” February 2011 at page 2  < 
http://www.bis.org/publ/othp13.pdf>
22
 „Leverage ratios serve a macro prudential response –  in respect of the cyclical movement of leverage at 
the system wide level. Leverage which tends to build up prior to crisis periods, is subsequently unwound when a 
crisis occurs. This cyclical aspect exacerbates both the upswing phase and the downturn. In addition, what could 
appear to be very low risk assets at the institutional level, can ultimately create incentives for the build-up of 
F. Information gaps  in  Over-the Counter (OTC)  derivative markets –  ongoing 
efforts by the Basel Committee to address these
In  view  of  the  inter  dependencies  between  systemic,  liquidity  risks,  moral  hazard, 
transparency, information asymmetries and disclosure, ongoing efforts by the Committee to 
address information gaps in OTC derivative markets cannot be regarded as surprising. Efforts 
being undertaken by the Basel Committee, as well as other bodies such as the Financial 
Stability Board, in focusing on a more system-wide based regulatory process involve the 
implementation  of  “time dimension” and “cross  sectional  dimension” macro prudential 
policies, as well  as plans  aimed at facilitating these policies. Such a macro prudential 
approach will consequently result in greater extension of regulation to the securities markets. 
Further, it will help facilitate the monitoring of vital and useful information such as market 
wide asset prices and liquidity. Substantial work is currently taking place to address important 
data gaps:23
Within the overall  programme, priorities involve the provision of information on 
aspects where the absence of good information has proved costly, and in particular:
- i) The inter linkages between large, globally systemically important institutions
- ii)  Emerging  concentrations  of  risk  in  terms  of  both  exposures  and  funding 
dependencies to certain institutions, countries and financial sectors;
- iii) The transfer and ultimate holding of risk
- iv) System wide leverage and maturity mismatches
G. Sovereign Debts and Moral Hazard Attributed to Sovereign Debt Bailouts
During the recent Financial Crisis (as well as the 2010 and ongoing European Sovereign Debt 
Crisis), several governments have had to raise their debt levels in order to stabilize their 
economies. The principal problem attributed to sovereign debts, which is  linked to their 
characteristics,24 is the possibility of defaults occurring. Increased doubts in relation to the 
risks at the broader system level.”
23
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  See Bank for International Settlements, „Macro prudential Policy Tools and Frameworks: Update to 
G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors” February 2011 at page 3  < 
http://www.bis.org/publ/othp13.pdf>
24
 Sovereign debts differ from private debts in view of the fact that:
likelihood of larger sovereigns “rolling over maturing debt on their own”, as well as the 
consequential  occurrence   of  “very  high,  economically  penalizing,  interest  rates”,  is 
considered to be the present reality.25 
Another problem involves bailouts related to sovereign debts: Whilst bailouts are deemed 
essential in facilitating financial stability, moral hazard, increased costs (particularly with 
regards to high interest rates), attributed to such bailouts need to be addressed. Where bailouts 
are eventually granted, distressed countries in need of such bailouts should be assisted in 
completing the repayments relating to such bailouts (through the extension of repayment 
periods or reduced interest rates) –  rather than aggravating their position (hence facilitating 
the risk of defaults).
Whilst bailouts, in certain instances, are necessary in order to facilitate financial stability, such 
bailouts should occur as a means of last resort –  after other initiatives and remedies have been 
applied and sought. 
On March 12 2011, EU officials announced the following remedies –  as a means of sustaining 
European sovereign debt markets:26
- Doubling the lending capacity of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF)27 
from 220 billion Euros to 440 billion Euros
- Collateral is rarely ever provided;
- No direct means exist to ensure the enforcement of the repayment of sovereign debts
- No specified procedures exist in respect of a sovereign debtor who is unwilling to pay. See S 
Brandauer, “Sovereign Debt and Economic Policies in Global Markets: A Political Economy Approach” 
(2006) –  particularly chapter on “Domestic Debt as a Commitment Device –  A  Probabilistic Voting 
Model of Sovereign Debt” at page 20  http://edoc.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5082/1/Brandauer_Stefan.pdf 
(last visited 19 May 2011) 
25
2
 See N Economides and RC Smith, „Trichet Bonds To Resolve the European Sovereign Debt Problem“ 
26
 See N Isaac, „EU Bailouts Fail to Keep European Sovereign Debt Markets Afloat“ April 2011 
<http://www.elliottwave.com>
27
On the 9th May 2010, Europe’s Finance Ministers approved the creation of the European Financial 
Stability
 Facility –  which is aimed at preserving financial stability in Europe (through the provision of financial 
assistance to Euro zone states during periods of economic difficulty). The objective of the EFSF being the 
collection of funds and the provision of loans in conjunction with the IMF to address the financing needs of 
Euro area member states in difficulty. Euro area member states are to provide guarantees for EFSF issuance 
of up to a total of 440 billion euro on a pro rata basis. See G Calice, J Chen and J Williams, “Liquidity 
Interactions in Credit Markets: An  Analysis of the Euro zone Sovereign Debt Crisis>  at page 1 of 41 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1776425>
- Purchasing the sovereign debt of primary markets, as needed
- Extending the repayment period for and lower than the interest rate charged on 
Greece’s rescue loans.
It is not surprising that yields on the ten year Spanish, Greek and Portuguese bonds soared to 
new records, following the announcement. Such reaction serves only to justify the assertion 
that bailouts should not always be granted liberally without having consulted other measures. 
Sovereign debts, as highlighted earlier on in the abstract (and this section of the paper), given 
their  nature, are more susceptible to defaults  than other forms  of  private debts.  The 
possibilities of such defaults occurring are further increased where bailouts are granted in 
relation to these debts.
Distressed countries, once granted bail-outs, should be given full assurance (by grantors of the 
bail-outs) that continued assistance will be provided in the form of accompanying aids to 
assist in completing repayments relating to such bailouts (through the extension of repayment 
periods or reduced interest rates) –  rather than aggravating their position (hence facilitating 
the risk of defaults).
According to Economides and Smith, the European authorities’ solution relating to the ECB’s 
purchase of outstanding sovereign debt in the market (as of January 2011) had only succeeded 
in buying a small amount of the distressed debt whilst pushing bond prices upwards as a result 
of such intervention. They propose the creation of so called “Trichet Bonds” which are 
intended to be ”new long duration bonds issued by countries in the EU  area that are to be 
collateralized by zero-coupon bonds of the same duration issued by the ECB”.28 Advantages 
attributed to such “Trichet Bonds” are as follows:29
- Trichet Bonds  Eliminate Uncertainties  in  respect of  the Refinancing  Distressed 
Countries’ Maturing Debt
- Trichet Bonds will be of much higher quality than present sovereign debt of distressed 
countries
- Trichet bonds will be liquid
- Trichet bonds will require no bailouts and imply no moral hazard
- Trichet Bonds provide debt relief for distressed economies
28
2
 See N Economides and R C Smith, „Trichet Bonds to Resolve the European Sovereign Debt Problem“ 
at page 2  <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1836743>
29
 Ibid at pages 5 and 6
- The exchange is voluntary and beneficial to both countries and debt holders
Such  Trichet bonds, indeed, would have provided a better alternative to the remedies 
announced by EU officials on March 12, 2011. Had such Trichet bonds been considered as an 
initial resort, and given the existence of appropriate and adequate incentives for countries 
issuing such bonds, as well as debt holders to participate in the exchange process, they could 
have served as better initial options than the subsequent European bailouts.
Any possibilities or likelihood of successfully implementing such Trichet bonds at present, 
should be considered doubtful since no incentives would appear to exist –  with respect to 
distressed EU countries such as Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal, in issuing such bonds. 
This is attributed to the fact that such countries having had a “better offer” in agreeing to the 
March 12 2011 remedies, are likely to be more reluctant to purchase “zero coupon collateral 
bonds” directly from the (European Central Bank) ECB. Apart from addressing whether such 
countries are able to “apply some of (or any of) their reserves held by the ECB  for this 
purpose, or otherwise enter into an appropriate financing package with the ECB,”30 there 
would appear to be less incentives for such countries to issue these Trichet bonds since they 
have relatively long term obligations ( ten year bonds) at present. For these reasons, such 
possibilities of having provided a collateral with exchanged sovereign bonds (via the issue of 
Trichet bonds by distressed European countries), have been significantly reduced. There is 
now increased likelihood (with increased national deficits of certain distressed countries) that 
defaults will occur.
I I. Should sovereign debts be encouraged?
Increased costs31 of sovereign debts will not only discourage investors in purchasing such 
debts (hence promoting a situation where higher yields  occur) but would also increase 
possibilities where some bond holders (investors) may have to share costs attributed to future 
bailouts –  with possibilities that taxpayers could even become involved in the cost sharing 
process.
Sovereign debts should be encouraged: i) where such debts are required for the stabilization 
of economies and;  ii) where some form of collateral accompanies such debts.
30
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 See ibid at page 5
31
- Booming deficits and the need to finance banking bailouts worth billions have turned sovereign 
bonds into
the new “junk debt market”. Investors are now paying $88,000 to insure $I million worth of debt issued 
by a group of sovereign countries –  or 88 basis points –  more than the $83,000 paid to insure $1 million 
worth of corporate debt. The growing problems of the Greek economy during 2010 resulted in the cost of its 
protection against default rising to more than 400 basis points.” See E Moya, “Greece and the Rising Costs 
of Sovereign Bonds” 29 January 2010 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/jan/29/greece-debt-eu-
sovereign-bonds> 
  
H. Role of New Basel Liquidity Standards in Mitigating Sovereign Debt Crises 
It is argued that the new liquidity standards should help facilitate greater diversification of the 
pool of liquid assets held by banks –  contrary to the argument presented by those who are of 
the opinion that the new liquidity standards will facilitate a situation where a concentration of 
government debts are encouraged.32 According to the Basel Committee’s most recent impact 
study, “bank holdings of liquid assets –  which continue to be dominated by exposures to 
sovereigns, central banks and zero percent risk weighted public sector entities, comprise 85% 
of banks’ liquid assets.”33 Having considered both new liquidity standards,34 it could be said 
that the second standard, that is the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) Standard, is more likely 
to facilitate a situation where assets are concentrated and susceptible to sovereign exposures. 
In any case, the crucial issue relates to the need to address the liquidity needs of such banking 
entities –  and consideration of the fact that such standards did not exist previously –  hence 
contributing to the fuelling of systemic and liquidity risks which triggered the recent Financial 
Crisis.
Furthermore, the additional  leverage ratios  which  are to be introduced35 by  the Basel 
Committee, should help in facilitating the diversification of liquid assets. The two new 
standards, on their own, would probably not be able to effectively achieve the objective of 
diversification of liquid assets.
Leverage ratios will therefore play vital roles at the present time (and in the future) by:
32
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 See S Walter, „Basel III: Stronger Banks and a More Resilient Financial System“ 
http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp110406.pdf at page 4 of 12
33
 ibid
34
 “The first objective of the two standards is to promote the short-term resiliency of the liquidity risk 
profile of institutions by ensuring that they have sufficient high quality liquid resources to survive an acute stress 
scenario  lasting  for one month. The Committee developed the Liquidity  Coverage Ratio  to achieve this 
objective. The second objective is to promote resiliency over longer-term time horizons by creating additional 
35
 “The Basel Committee agreed to introduce a simple, transparent, non-risk based leverage ratio that is 
calibrated to act as a credible supplementary measure to the risk based capital requirements. The leverage ratio is 
intended to achieve the objectives of constraining the build-up of leverage in the banking sector, helping avoid 
destabilizing deleveraging processes which can damage the broader financial system and the economy; and 
reinforcing  the risk  based requirements with a simple non-risk  based “back  stop” measure.” See Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, “Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for More Resilient Banks and 
Banking Systems” at pages 68-69 of 77
- Helping to facilitate the diversification of assets –  liquid assets in particular (and with 
respect to the new liquidity standards); and
- Helping to avoid the present consequential effects of Basel III  –  where banks, in an 
aim to achieve regulatory capital and leverage ratio requirements, are compelled into a 
situation where aggressive de leverage occurs.
I. How Can the New Basel Liquidity Standards be Implemented More Optimally to 
Mitigate Sovereign Debt Crises: Importance of Information Channels
Market Liquidity and Sovereign Debts: Monitoring of Information Channels
“Manipulation of market liquidity is often the primary mechanism through which speculative 
attacks are channeled and in this case, the object of interest is the bilateral liquidity structure 
of the sovereign debt market and the sovereign CDS  (Credit Default Swap) market.”36 The 
role  and  impact of  the manipulation  of  the CDS  market by  speculative  investors  in 
exacerbating the liquidity dry up in the market for Greek, Irish, Portuguese and Spanish 
sovereign  debts,  during  the  2010  Euro  Crisis,  raised  concerns  amongst  several 
commentators.37
In this respect, greater focus on Pillar 3 of Basel II  and the ever increasing need for greater 
measures aimed at extending capital rules (as well as other regulatory measures) to the 
securities markets, comes into play. If securities markets were not so lightly regulated as is the 
case with  banks,  less  opportunities  would  be presented to investors  who  are able to 
manipulate38 CDS  markets. Measures  aimed at facilitating  greater enhanced disclosures 
continue to play a vital role in facilitating market discipline. However, in order to reduce 
incidences of “manipulation” by speculative investors, greater discretion in respect of the 
timing and release of information to investors, will be required. Just as information plays a 
crucial role in fuelling bank runs, it also plays a vital role in manipulation within the CDS 
36
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 See G Calice, J Chen and J Williams, “Liquidity Interactions in Credit Markets: An Analysis of the 
Euro zone Sovereign Debt Crisis> at page 5 of 41 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1776425>
37
 See ibid at page 2 of 41
38
 “In particular, “naked” CDS  positions were blamed for driving bond yields on Greek, Irish, Spanish 
and Portuguese debt higher during the first half of 2010. Further, the manipulation of the CDS  market by 
speculative investors was considered to have played a vital role in facilitating the dry up in the market for such 
countries’ sovereign debts. See ibid
markets.  Regulations  which  are  able  to  address  “short-term  speculative  short  selling 
practices” in respect of sovereign debts will be required within the CDS markets. 
It has also been demonstrated that “whilst liquidity of the sovereign debt market dried up over 
the Crisis period of 2010, the liquidity of the CDS market increase dramatically with spread 
bids and spreads asked (offered) –  approaching a one to one ratio.”
J. Conclusion
As highlighted in a previous paper, “the monitoring of useful data - such as market-wide data 
on asset prices and liquidity, institution related information such as credit default swap (CDS) 
spreads and equity prices, additional institution-specific information related to the ability of 
the institution to fund itself in various wholesale funding markets, and the price at which it 
can do so, will be vital in obtaining a source of instantaneous data on potential liquidity 
problems.”39
In  relation to the “cross sectional dimensional aspect” of the Basel Committee’s macro 
prudential policies, several provisions in Basel III  should help to “address system risk and 
interconnectedness among (global) systemic institutions, by mitigating the risks arising from 
firm-level  “cross  dimensional”  approach  exposures.  These  include:  higher  capital 
requirements for trading and derivative activities, complex securitizations and off balance 
sheet exposures,  capital  incentives  for  banks  to use  central  counter  parties  for  OTC 
derivatives; liquidity  requirements that better address  funding  risks  related to excessive 
reliance on wholesale short term funding.”40
Until intended leverage ratios are introduced and coupled with the new liquidity standards 
[namely: the (Liquid Coverage Ratio) LCR and the Net stable Funding Ratio (NSFR)]; these 
standards will probably not achieve half their desired effects –  since liquid assets could be 
accumulated under these standards, such as to an extent where they are susceptible to 
sovereign exposures. This is one reason (amongst many)41, for concluding that whilst the 
39
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 See M  Ojo, „Preparing for Basel IV  –  Why Liquidity Risks Still Present a Challenge to Regulators in 
Prudential Supervision (II); and also Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “Basel III: A Global Regulatory 
Framework  for  More  Resilient  Banks  and  Banking  Systems”  at  page  18  of  17 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf>
40
4
 Bank for International Settlements, „Macro prudential Policy Tools and Frameworks: Update to G20 
Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors” February 2011 at page 7  < http://www.bis.org/publ/othp13.pdf>
41
 Further challenges presented to Basel III include the restrictions imposed on it by the Dodd Frank Act –  
even though the Act is similar to Basel III in several respects (for example, in respect of its requirements of more 
stringent capital and liquidity standards, and a non risk leverage ratio).
Basel Committee has gone a long way in addressing liquidity risks, its efforts still remain a 
modest milestone in combating liquidity risks in prudential supervision.
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